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ABSTRACT
This article examines political campaign films from the point of
view of propaganda to explore how this idea fits into the context
of a democratic Nordic nation. During the Cold War, Finland was
governed by Urho Kekkonen as President for 25 years (1956–81).
The authors look at Kekkonen’s campaign films to see how his
public image was meticulously planned and systematically shaped
to create an almost mythical figure. The political and media con-
text in which these films were presented is also analysed to under-
stand how Eastern and Western influences affected the content
and style of persuasion in the films. As a result, they find a
bricolage of propagandistic influences from both sides of the
Iron Curtain.
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Introduction
Propaganda has traditionally been connected to authoritarian regimes and dictator-
ships, like the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. Nowadays, after the popularity of terms
like public relations, promotion, and political marketing, the term has again surfaced to
describe the current atmosphere of ‘info wars’, ‘cyber-attacks’, ‘trolling’, ‘disinforma-
tion’, and ‘post-truth politics’. Propaganda is having its revival.
Not only is propaganda a topical concept inworld politics of the late 2010s, its revitalisation
can also offer new understandings of Cold War history. As Cold War studies from new
perspectives such as analysingmultileveled-multipolar interaction have shown in recent years,
these approaches provide fresh insights in comparison tomore traditional studies on the Iron
Curtain, bipolarity, and détente.1 Earlier analyses of the role of propaganda in the Cold War
have mostly concerned Soviet or American versions of it.2 However, propaganda was also
utilised by democratic, neutral countries in their internal policies.
Besides infamous totalitarian regimes, democratic systems have seen the massive use of
modern media for propaganda purposes. Since ‘propaganda is an integral feature of demo-
cratic societies’, it is also necessary to examine democracies and their relation to propaganda to
CONTACT Jukka Kortti jukka.kortti@helsinki.fi Faculty of Social Sciences/Political HistoryUniversity of Helsinki,
Helsinki, Finland
1E.g. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
2E.g. Nicholas Cull, ‘Reading, Viewing, and Tuning in to the Cold War,’ in The Cambridge History of the Cold War.
Volume 2: Crises and Détente, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 438–59; and Walter. L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945–1961 (New York:
St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998).
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understand more profoundly what propaganda is about, how widely it has been used
historically, and how to draw the line between propaganda and other types of persuasion.3
One way to look at this is to analyse how politicians have been presented in democracies. In
terms of personality cult and image-making, the most evident examples can be found in
political campaigning.
As our case study, we present Finland, a country attempting to balance Eastern and
Western political influences during the Cold War. Of those European countries fighting in
the Second World War, only Britain and Finland continued as parliamentary democracies
throughout the war. Moreover, Finland survived as a democracy in the inter-war period,
unlikemost of the Eastern andCentral European countries. After fighting the Soviet Union in
two wars (1939–40 and 1941–44), Finland continued unoccupied. During the post-war years
in the late 1940s, it was feared that Finland would follow in Czechoslovakia’s footsteps and
become a communist satellite. Finlanddid remain aWestern capitalist society, but had to cope
with the Soviets, who had an influence on not only the foreign, but also the internal politics of
Finland. Thismeant that, in order to succeed in the Finnish political sphere, a politician had to
have good relationships with the Soviets. This was one of the main reasons why Urho
Kekkonen (1900–86) managed to remain in office as president for a term that lasted
25 years (1956–81).4 This type of long-term position was a regular arrangement in the
communist dictatorships of the Eastern bloc during the era, but not so much in Western
democracies.5 In Finland, itwas partly due to the president’s relativelywide powers at the time.
Historically, this was grounded in a compromise made betweenmonarchists and republicans
when Finland gained its independence from Russia in 1917. As a result, the president had the
right to summon and dissolve Parliament, as well as decide on Finland’s relationships with
other countries. The way Kekkonen used – often stretched – presidential powers served as
remarkable grounds for changing the constitution.6 Of the main democratic republics of
Europe, the Finnish system resembled that of France.
Urho Kekkonen, Doctor of Laws and a parliamentarian of the Agrarian League begin-
ning in 1936, was an extremely skilful and ambitious politician. Together with his political
aides and eminences grises, he used the media to construct an image of a sovereign and
brilliant father figure and leader of the nation.We take his campaign films, in the context of
propaganda, as empirical material to analyse how his image was created. During the 1950s,
propaganda as a term was still widely used both in the planning of campaignsas well as in
academic7 discussion. Moreover, we look at the political and media context, where these
3Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, ‘Introduction: Thirteen Propositions about Propaganda,’ in The Oxford
Handbook of Propaganda Studies, eds. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online
Publication 2014), 12.
4Kekkonen’s relationship to the Soviet Union has been an issue of heated debate among Finnish historians as well
as politicians in the decades after his era. Meinander has described this as an ideological power struggle around the
‘kekkographic disagreement’, where Juhani Suomi and Hannu Rautkallio have represented opposite sides. See Henrik
Meinander, Kekkografia. Historiaesseitä (Helsinki: Siltala, 2010).
5Kekkonen was not the only long-term Western state leader during the era. Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) served
as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 to 1963 and the Prime Minister of Sweden, Tage
Erlander (1901–85), was in office in 1946–69. However, neither was elected without an electoral process as Kekkonen
was in 1974 (see later in this article ).
6The constitution was changed in 2000, which diminished the powers of the president, moving from a ‘semi-
presidential’ system to a more parliamentary one.
7Erkka Railo et al., Kamppailu vallasta. Eduskuntavaalikampanjat 1945–2015 (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2016), 1–153;
Jaakko Nousiainen, Tutkimus eräiden sanomalehtien vaalipropagandasta vuoden 1956 presidentinvaaleissa. Acta Politica.
Edidit instutum politicum universitatis Helsingiensis. Fasc. I. (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1958).
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films were presented, in order to understand how Eastern and Western influences affected
the content and style of persuasion.
In the analysis, we examine the Kekkonen campaign films from the point of view of
‘special techniques’ used in propaganda, as well as which traditions these techniques can
be associated with. We thus refer and compare Kekkonen campaign films to propa-
ganda and leader cults produced in the twentieth century totalitarian regimes on the
one hand, and to the American presidential campaigns on the other. The idea is to
present the most obvious similarities found with international films from both sides of
the Iron Curtain, not to conduct a systematic comparison of certain designated cam-
paign films. By examining the rhetorical elements found in the films, we aim to unravel
how the leadership image and cult of personality was being constructed. These elements
include particularly the ‘visual symbols of power’, ‘language usage’, and ‘music as
propaganda’.8
Propagandising leadership in democracy
Propaganda has belonged to the arsenals of sovereign rulers since Ancient times.
Prominent examples can be found from Alexander the Great (356–23 BCE) and
Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) to Elisabeth I (1533–1603). Spectacles and symbolic rituals
especially have served as popular propaganda media among sovereigns and monarchs
prior to the phenomenon of contemporary mass media. In modern times, propaganda
has been organised and targeted towards the masses, and the goal of communication
has been to promote the ideological purposes of a propagandist. Media have been used
according to the peculiarities of a medium. The American communication scholars
Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell have defined propaganda as ‘the deliberate,
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour
to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’.9 In this
respect, the term propaganda as an umbrella concept not only concerns the evils of
totalitarian systems or the means for carrying out martial law, but also democracies.
Jowett and O’Donnell classify propaganda as ranging from black, which is based on
spreading lies, to white, where communication is basically accurate but biased; in
between these is the grey area. White propaganda can be seen as synonymous with
public-relations (PR), branding, and advertising. American communication scholar
Michael Schudson has called American advertising ‘capitalist realism’.10 Like socialist
realist art, it ‘simplifies and typifies. It does not claim to picture reality as it is but reality
as it should be – life and lives worth emulating.’ According to Schudson, whereas Soviet
art idealises the producer, American art idealises the consumer.11
In this way, the relationship between advertising and totalitarian systems is not that
far-fetched or even a metaphorical notion. Historically, both Nazi propaganda and
American post-war advertising used Austrian (Jewish) based psychological ideas to
8Jowett and O’Donnel, Propaganda and Persuasion, 327–9.
9Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 6th ed. (London: Sage, 2015), 7.
10‘Capitalist realism’ refers to the concept of ‘commercial realism’ by sociologist Ervin Goffman. (Michael Schudson,
Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion. Its Dubious Impact on American Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers,
1984), 214.
11Schudson, Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion, 214–15, 220 (citation 215).
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persuade. In the name of motivation research, both were interested in finding ‘order out
of chaos’, as ‘the father of PR’ Edward Bernays had famously put it in his 1928 book,
Propaganda . In late 1950s America, that meant a great interest in ‘subliminal advertis-
ing’, which was supposed to target the subconscious. During the most paranoiac times
of the Cold War, this frightened people; it was seen as a key to effective mass
propaganda and consequently as a sign of an Orwellian society.12 Yet it soon appeared
that subliminal advertising did not actually work. Motivation research, as well as the
overall cultural influence of the advertising industry, started to be criticised not only by
academics, but also by the public living under Cold War paranoia.13
Indeed, American political campaigning has made beneficial use of advertising
professionals since at least 1952, when one of the most celebrated American admen,
Rosser Reeves, famously took care of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidential campaign
ads – in ‘merchandising Ike’.14 Eight years later, the biography-style film of John F.
Kennedy, The New Frontier, became a symbol of campaign films. The film combined
documentary techniques with photographs and produced a chronology of his personal
history. Since the famous debate between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy in 1960,
TV debates directed public attention towards the candidates’ need to create a positive
TV image.15 After 1960, both politicians and campaign officers were better informed on
media logic, and the campaign films combined documentary expression, advertising
techniques, and news style. In 1968, Nixon was sold like soap or cigarettes, as journalist
Joe McGinnis wrote about Nixon’s campaign in his classic work, The Selling of the
president.16
The construction of political leadership has been an important aspect of propaganda,
oftentimes amounting to building the cult of personality, especially in totalitarian or
authoritarian regimes. Cultural historian Peter Burke has analysed the idealising and
making of a heroic leader or in some other way making leaders superior, calling it
image management.17 This idealisation involves constructing the leader as a mythical
character, whose persona is essential to the regime. Myths are powerful as they help to
analyse and understand the world, by underlining certain characteristics of matters and
leaving out others. Myths also seek to naturalise the interpretations of reality they
contain and disguise their constructed nature.18 As propaganda entails affecting mental
structures and as such people’s belief systems, it is also connected to myth-making.
12Lawrence R. Samuel, ‘“Order Out of Chaos”: Freud, Fascism, and the Golden Age of American Advertising’, in The
Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, eds. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Online Publication 2014), 262–76.
13On Hidden Persuaders, see e.g. Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness. Advertising and the Social Roots of the
Consumer Culture (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 187–92; Stephen Fox, The Mirror Makers (London: Heinemann, 1984),
185–7; and David Haven Blake, Liking Ike. Eisenhower, Advertising, and the Rise of Celebrity Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 112–18.
14See e.g. Diamond and Bates, The Spot, 51–65; and Blake, Liking Ike, 71–80.
15Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the president (London: Penguin, 1970); Joanne Morreale, A New Beginning: A Textual
Frame Analysis of the Political Campaign Film (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 4; and Diamond and
Bates, The Spot, 109–12.
16McGinnis, The Selling of the president.
17Peter Burke, Eyewitnessing. The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001),
72–80.
18Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Pierre Vives, 1957); Mika Aaltonen, ‘Suomalaisen johtamisen kuvia Kalevalassa,
Vänrikki Stoolin tarinoissa, Seitsemässä veljeksessä ja Tuntemattomassa sotilaassa,’ Liiketaloudellinen aikakauskirja LTA –
Finnish Journal of Business Economics no. 2 (1998); Morreale, A New Beginning, 6, 46.
4 L. LOUNASMERI AND J. KORTTI
In constructing powerful mental images, concrete imagery is paramount. Even if
written communication has a substantial role in politics, the significance of visual
communication in making a politician known and appreciated is essential. Imagery
appeals directly to emotions rather than to rationality. Unlike with factual argumenta-
tion, the viewer does not need to contemplate or analyse to understand the cultural
myths that are recycled.19 Consequently, analysing the visual symbols of power is one of
the key areas in propaganda studies.20
Using visual communication in image construction is commonplace in the twenty-
first century, but as Kekkonen fought to become president of Finland in 1955, it was
still rather unheard of in Finnish political culture. After he became President, Kekkonen
was a winning motif in imagery and a popular leader, who became well known and was
sold to the people with pictures.21 The imagery in the media constructed a Kekkonen
who was at once sovereign and a stylish head of state, as well as an athlete and a strong
fellow man. This public image was an essential part of his leadership, and in the course
of time, its elements also constructed a mythical aura around his figure.
Obviously, as in every media historical approach, taking the historical climate into
consideration is crucial when trying to understand a media-related phenomenon like
propaganda. Understanding propaganda means understanding who, why, for whom,
and for what purposes it is organised.22 We start by examining the Finnish media
context during the era in question.
The Finnish media environment from the 1950s to the 1970s
In Kekkonen’s era, the Finnish media landscape was characterised by public-service
television offering limited programming, an active movie culture, and a strong party
press, especially in the 1950s and 1960s; this created politically like-minded bubbles,
just like in the current age of social media. At that time, an effective way to reach wide
audiences was through the movie theatres, which had relatively big audiences. Finns
particularly watched Finnish movies and in 1952, Finland produced more feature films
than any other country per capita.23 Moreover, the production of documentaries or
other short films was in its heyday. The use of news breaks in the cinema was also a
common way to spread the word in the Soviet Union in the early decades. Although a
film is a powerful tool of persuasion, film propaganda may not always have the effect
hoped-for, since cinema culture is attuned to escapist entertainment or considered as an
art form.24 In the Finnish case, Finns had long been accustomed to shorts that operated
somewhere between education and advertising.
Television broadcasting, in turn, started in Finland in 1956 with the commercially
independent company TES-TV. Although the channel was financed by advertising and
19Morreale, A New Beginning.
20Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 327.
21Kalle Kultala, Kohtalona Kekkonen (Helsinki: Tammi, 1980), 4, 198.
22On the importance of the context in film, see Barbara Klinger, ‘Film History Terminable and Interminable:
Recovering the Past in Reception Studies,’ Screen 38, no. 2 (1997): 108–28; on propaganda, see Jowett and
O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 316–21.
23Kari Uusitalo, ‘Suomalainen elokuvatuotanto 1948–1952,’ in Suomen kansallisfilmografia 4, 1948–1952, chief ed.
Kari Uusitalo (Helsinki: Edita, 1992), 21.
24Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 265.
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sponsorship – Finland being in the vanguard of commercial television in Europe – its
broadcasting licence did not allow political advertising or news production. The
national broadcasting company Yleisradio had a monopoly on news and political affairs
until the 1980s, and political advertising only appeared on cable television in the late
1980s – and on the national network only in 1992. In terms of propaganda, a monopoly
over the communication source can be a crucial point in whether the public is going to
challenge the message.25 When Yleisradio started its regular television broadcasting in
1958, it did so with the New Year’s speech of President Urho Kekkonen.
Even though television spread rather rapidly in Finland, it did not reach its position
as a medium to gather a wide national audience until the mid-1960s.26 In this sense, it
created the national public sphere in which people became predisposed to the ideas and
ideologies of others than their own party or other interest groups. It certainly influ-
enced people’s political involvement, which was high during the rise of the baby
boomers and the overall turmoil of the 1960s. During the 1960s, political television
programmes were strictly regulated by political parties.27 Overall, the culture of TV
journalism discussing politics in Finland has been described as elite journalism, thus
enabling the politicians to perform on the TV stage, while the people acted as an
audience.28 In Finnish political culture, a tradition of loyalty towards those in power, as
well as a respectful attitude towards the institution of the presidency, prevailed at the
same time.29 Also, politicians have traditionally been among the first to take advantage
of new modes of communication.30
Kekkonen: a controversial political animal
Kekkonen had already become a shining example of his generation in his student years
in the 1920s. He was a charismatic student leader and an activist, who soon showed
himself to be an excellent rhetorician and skilled writer. He developed his ideas on
nationalism, democratic rule, and the role of political institutions from early on.31 In
the early 1930s, Kekkonen was in Germany writing his doctoral dissertation and
became Doctor of Laws in 1936. Even though he did not approve of fascism, he realised
that the way the national socialists appealed to the people was very efficient.32
Before starting his political career, Kekkonen worked for the security police Etsivä
keskuspoliisi in the 1920s.33 Later in the 1930s, when Kekkonen became a minister
25Ibid., 326.
26The number of TV licences in Finland reached half one million in 1964 and a million in 1969; the population was
4.5 million at that time.
27Ville Pitkänen, ‘The Changing Representations of Political Leadership. Political Television Debates in Finnish
Newspapers from the 1960s to the New Millennium,’ in Leadership and New Trends in Political Communication, Selected
Papers, eds. Emiliana De Blasio, Matthew Hibberd, and Michele Sorice (Rome: CMCS Working Papers), 263–92.
28Hannu Nieminen, ‘Viestintä ja demokratia. Kohti pluralistista julkisuutta?,’ in Viestinnän jäljillä. Näkökulmia uuden
ajan ilmiöön, eds. Ullamaija Kivikuru and Risto Kunelius (Helsinki: WSOY, 1998), 287; and Anne Koski, ‘Siirtoja
kuvaruudulla. Television poliittisten ohjelmien poliittisuus 1960-luvulta nykypäivään,’ in Television viisi
vuosikymmentä. Suomalainen televisio ja sen ohjelmat 1950-luvulta, ed. Juhani Wiio (Helsinki: SKS, 2007), 203.
29Jarmo Virmavirta, Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat (Helsinki: Kirjastudio, 2005), 10.
30Koski, ‘Siirtoja kuvaruudulla,’ 203.
31See e.g. Jukka Kortti, ‘Ylioppilaslehti and the University’s Language Struggle in the 1920s and 1930s,’ Kasvatus &
Aika 3, no. 4 (2009): 7–23.
32Vesa Sisättö, Anu Ala-Korpela, and Mikko Metsämäki, Operaatio Kekkonen (Helsinki: Tammi, 2000), 23–4.
33Juhani Suomi, Urho Kekkonen 1936–1944. Myrrysmies (Helsinki: Otava 1986), 54–121.
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(Minister of Justice, 1936–37, Minister of the Interior 1937–39) and tried to ban the
fascist, right-wing party the Patriotic People’s Movement (IKL), he faced his first
significant political adversaries at the national level. IKL was established after the so-
called Lapua Movement was banned at the turn of the 1930s. As in many European
countries, right-wing radicalism also appeared in Finland during the inter-war period.
During the war years, he was not a minister, but was active in many governmental
tasks and duties. What was remarkable for Kekkonen’s later political life was his
changing attitude towards the wartime enemy, the Soviet Union, during the war.
After the Winter War (1939–40), he voted against the Moscow peace treaty, in which
Finland had to cede areas along the eastern border with the Soviet Union. However,
during the Continuation War (1941–44), when Finland fought on the German side, he
became one of the leading politicians in the cross-party ‘Peace opposition’, which
wanted Finland to step out of the war. Right after the war, Kekkonen became
Minister of Justice again. During this post, he had to deal with the so-called war-
responsibility trials against Finnish wartime leaders. In these trials, which were con-
ducted entirely according to Finnish law (apart from the committee set up by the Allied
Control Commission, which made a list of war criminals), many leading Finnish
wartime leaders, including the wartime president of Finland, Risto Ryti, were sentenced
to prison.34 The trials evoked criticism of Kekkonen, particularly among the political
right, which afterwards influenced his career.
In the post-war years, until the presidential election of 1956, Kekkonen was
Deputy Speaker and Speaker of the Parliament, a Minister (besides Minister of
Justice and Minister of Interior, also Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Prime
Minister several times. During the 1950s, Kekkonen strongly supported President
J.K. Paasikivi’s policy of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
Kekkonen was already a presidential candidate for the Agrarian Party in the 1950
elections when Paasikivi was elected.
Overall, Kekkonen’s background as an ardent anti-right-wing politician, yet not a
left-winger, had a significant effect on how he was seen among the Finnish political
right later in the post-war period. His changing policies towards the Soviet Union
during and after the Second World War were seen as the first signs of his oppor-
tunistic politics towards the Soviets. The way he harnessed his Soviet relationships
to the internal policy of Finland also displeased the Social Democrats. Moreover, his
background in the security police was seen as evidence of how Kekkonen was
indeed familiar with the methods that were not suitable in an open democracy,
such as using personal, secret sources to enhance his position as a politician. He
promoted his own cause and acquired a reputation as an intriguer. As the British
minister to Helsinki described Kekkonen in 1949, he was a man whose ‘ability has
never been questioned, but his sardonic, mordant wit has earned him many enemies
and his various flirtation with the communists has not added to his reputation for
“reliability” in right-wing circles’.35 Accordingly, whereas Kekkonen’s followers saw
34See e.g. Helena P. Evans, Diplomatic Deceptions. Anglo-Soviet Relations and the Fate of Finland 1944–1948
(Helsinki: SKS, 2011).
35Quoted from David Kirby, A Concise History of Finland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 249, David
Kirby uses ‘minister’ (with lower case). The diplomat in question, Sir Oswald Scott, was no an Ambassador. In other
words, he was representing Britain in Finland during the post-war years but was not an official Ambassador.
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all his political capabilities as skills and sharp pragmatism, his opponents considered
Kekkonen as a calculative, cunning, and unprincipled politician.
Kekkonen was very conscious of the significance of a public image to the exercise of
political power, and actively used different media to enhance such an image.36 He and
his backers had a strategic take on public appearances from early on. He produced – or
let others produce for him – a wide array of political works wherein he argued his
political views. He also understood the potential of radio, cinema, and later television in
the construction of a public image. A substantial amount of film material about
Kekkonen was produced during his political career.37 Campaign films were special
forms of addressing the people, and were used to appeal to voters and citizens.
Kekkonen’s long-time friends, the professor of ethnography Kustaa Vilkuna, governor
of Lapland Kaarlo Hillilä, and party secretary Arvo Korsimo, acted as his ‘powers
behind the scene’ for a long time. Especially regarding the presidential elections,
Vilkuna as well as Korsimo constructed a well-thought-out image of Kekkonen as a
national model and a great man.38
The analysis: three decades, three films
The material consists of three of Kekkonen’s campaign films from 1955, 1967, and 1978,
all of them much longer than TV spots, as those did not appear in Finnish campaigning
before the end of the 1980s. Moreover, these campaign films served as footage for the
two-to-three-month duration of the campaigns.
The film For the Nation was produced for the 1956 election campaign. In 1968,
running for the third time, Kekkonen appeared in the campaign film President,
Statesman. In 1977, before the 1978 elections, a film called Day of the President was
made about Kekkonen’s work as President. The first two were produced by the
Agrarian League party machinery and the third by Yleisradio. It was not an official
campaign film, but one describing Kekkonen’s work as a president. The 1956 and 1968
films were shown as short pictures in the movies and in party gatherings around the
country, resembling in this way the presentation techniques of fascist regimes. The 1977
film was shown on TV, and it attracted 1.7 million viewers at its premiere, in a country
of 4.5 million people.39
36See Timo J. Tuikka, Kekkosen konstit. Urho Kekkosen historia- ja politiikkakäsitykset teoriasta käytäntöön 1933–1981
(Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä University Printing House, 2007); Jukka-Pekka Puro, ‘Puhumalla hallitseminen: vahvan johtajuuden
ilmentyminen Kekkosen radiopuheissa vuosina 1937–1967,’ Lähikuva 29, no. 2 (2016): 22–42; and Timonen and Lammi,
‘Kekkosen matkassa.’
37Other movie productions about Kekkonen during his presidency were Decades of Change: Urho Kaleva Kekkonen
as the Navigator of Finnish Foreign Politics (1975, shown by YLE), The Creative Statesman by Juhan af Grann for
Kekkonen’s 75th birthday (1975, shown by the commercial channel MTV), and Mikko Niskanen’s CSCE – Peace as a Goal
(1980), which won the documentary category at the 1981 Moscow International Film Festival.
38Tuikka, Kekkosen konstit.
39The backgrounds for the films have been investigated by visiting the UKK Archive in Orimattila, Finland, by going
through the campaign speeches of Kekkonen, the ‘Rypsi’ campaign plan and film manuscript of 1955, and writings in
the Finnish and foreign press during elections. The following interviews were conducted: the director of the 1968 film
Kari Uusitalo; the retired YLE reporter Timo-Erkki Heino; the journalist Maarit Huovinen, who was part of the 1977 film
production crew; and Hanna Nurminen, the granddaughter of Kustaa Vilkuna, Kekkonen’s eminence gris.
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For the nation in 1956: a solid statesman rising from the ranks of ordinary people
For the 1956 presidential elections, Kekkonen’s public image was laboriously built. His
political aide and close friend Kustaa Vilkuna wrote a booklet, Urho Kekkonen, to
introduce his political persona.40 When the campaign film came out at the end of 1955,
Kekkonen had been Prime Minister several times, and become a much-contested figure
in Finnish political life.41 The presidential election was a fierce battle, and a lot has been
written about the Soviet influence on the result.42 Even though Kekkonen had wide
support, he also had adversaries in all the political parties, including his own.43 Other
candidates criticised him heavily for stirring up fear, over-emphasising foreign politics,
and taking personal credit for all the achievements of foreign policy.44 During the
campaigning, the yellow press published many scandalous stories about Kekkonen, and
he was depicted as a drunkard, rowdy, and a womaniser.
The campaign film was an attempt to build a credible and trustworthy image of
Kekkonen. Politically disputed issues were addressed and vicious rumours were counter
balanced with an overtly positive image of the politician. Kekkonen’s political career
needed to be presented in order to justify and legitimate his political message.
Kekkonen’s campaign was meticulously planned, creating an election organisation
and involving large circles of people nationwide, as is revealed in the party planning
documents.45 During the campaign, Kekkonen toured the country widely, delivering
hundreds of speeches. During the 1950s, before television and election programmes, the
touring played a significant role in delivering the message.46 Touring was something
new in Finnish presidential campaigning and Kekkonen was accused of American-style
campaigning. Many people thought this culture was not appropriate in the Finnish
context.47
During Kekkonen’s tenure, if one criticised him, one might very easily be labelled as
opposing the Soviet Union and official foreign politics. Opponents started being
labelled as ‘extreme right’, and were characterised as opposing ‘the people’, much in
the same way as Soviets would talk about enemies of the people, and the Nazis would
speak about Bolsheviks.
In the American context, negative campaigning in the form of mocking opponents,
where the aim was to manipulate voters by highlighting the weaknesses of an opponent,
had been done at least since the Adlai Stevenson campaign of 1956. A sort of milestone
40Sisättö et al., Operaatio Kekkonen, 28.
41Kansakunnan puolesta (For the Nation), directed by Johannes Huumo. Helsinki, Finland: Maalaisliitto ry, Mainos-
Matti Oy, 1955.
42See e.g. Kimmo Rentola, Niin kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947–1958 (Helsinki: Otava,
1997); Lasse Lehtinen, Aatosta jaloa ja alhaista mieltä. SDP:n ja Urho Kekkosen suhteet 1944–1981 (Helsinki: WSOY, 2002);
and Tuikka, Kekkosen konstit.
43The Agrarian League (today known as the Centre Party of Finland) was established as a political party of rural
communities in 1906. After the Second World War, the party became one of the four major political parties in Finland
and, together with Social Democrats, formed centre-left governments during the building of the Scandinavian type of
welfare state.
44Editorial, Sosialidemokraatti 13 January 1956; and Tuikka, Kekkosen konstit, 267–77.
45Presidentinvaali 1956, ‘Kirjeitä, asiakirjoja, vaalipropagandaa 1952-1955, mm. toimintasuunnitelma “Rypsi”, filmi-
suunnitelmia’, file 21/87, UKA (The Archives of President Urho Kekkonen).
46Reijo Perälä, Paavo Rytsä, and Elina Yli-Ojanperä, ‘Kekkosen vuoden 1956 vaalikampanja,’ 11 February 2014, Virtual
Archive of YLE, http://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2014/02/11/kekkosen-vuoden-1956-vaalikampanja (accessed 30 September 2017).
47Nousiainen, Tutkimus eräiden sanomalehtien vaalipropagandasta vuoden 1956 presidentinvaaleissa, 15; and
Virmavirta Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat, 17.
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in American campaigning was seen to occur, when the famous ‘Daisy’ spot by the
Lyndon B. Johnson campaign was aired (and ran only once before being pulled by the
Johnson campaign) in 1964. The commercial, showing a little girl picking petals off a
daisy, cut directly to a nuclear explosion, which was thought to characterise the
militarism of the right-wing Republican candidate Barry Goldwater. It was held that
if Goldwater were elected, he might start a nuclear war with the Soviets.48 The
candidate takes the role of a saviour when giving an account of the situation to the
people: he knows the way forward. Ordinary farmers and workers’ families, who have
lost family members in the war, are shown sitting by the radio. Everyone is dispirited
and depressed. The crutches of a veteran listening to the radio symbolise support.
Perhaps this support will also help to repair the broken nation, as well as the relation-
ship between Finland and the Soviet Union?
After the destruction of war, a relationship of trust was to be built with the former
enemy. Kekkonen speaks of facts and a ‘one and only’ possibility of carrying out a new
policy. In Finnish political culture, necessity and the so-called TINA (‘there is no
alternative’) argumentation has traditionally had a strong foothold. Creating an atmo-
sphere where there are no alternatives, a kind of absoluteness, was a strong theme of the
films, centring on foreign politics and Soviet relations. In this film, Kekkonen appeals
directly to the people so that they would not stir up disagreement or desperation. The
film shows the Finns as an original, pioneering people, who must find their way
through the marshlands and hills, since ‘there are no wide roads for us’.
The figure and politics of Kekkonen lean strongly on those of Paasikivi, the former
President (1946–56), who is employed as a supporter and legitimator of Kekkonen. The
name of the famous foreign policy termed the Paasikivi Kekkonen line was actually
developed by the campaign team (Johannes Huumo and Arvo Korsimo) for this
campaign; in fact, it used to be called the Paasikivi line. During the Cold War period,
it became an official concept in Finnish foreign policy.49 ‘These men laid the foundation
for Finnish foreign policy after the war,’ as it is declared in the film. Kekkonen is also
established as part of a chain of great statesmen by showing the official portraits of
former ministers, and revealing him as the most long-lived. To bring foreign politics
across as the central theme of the campaign was a deliberate ‘propaganda agenda’ set by
the Agrarian League in the 1956 election, which was especially underscored by its party
press.50
After the two wars against the Soviet Union (the Winter War, 1939–40, and the
Continuation War, 1941–44), there was heavy debate about how different politicians
had acted and taken stands during them. The film went on to prove that Kekkonen had
been consequential in his politics, and was laughed at, when he had spoken for peace in
1943. Kekkonen walks the aisles of Parliament as a steady and trustworthy figure who
stands by his words. Through his books, articles, and speeches a canon of his political
thinking is being built.
During the years of radicalism and extremism in the 1930s, Kekkonen is again
presented as creating national unity amid the conflictual situation. As Kekkonen tried
48Not only was Kekkonen a skilful rhetorician and speaker with a physically strong voice, but he also had extensive
experience in performing on the radio. See Salokangas, Yleisradio 1926–1996, 97–8.
49Tuikka Kekkosen konstit, 268.
50Nousiainen, Tutkimus eräiden sanomalehtien vaalipropagandasta vuoden 1956 presidentinvaaleissa, 29.
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to curb right-wing extremism as Minister of the Interior, he stayed firm, even though he
was persecuted and harassed by threatening letters and phone calls at night.
By showing men doing physical labour on their farms as well as in construction, a
bridge is being built towards the socialist parties, especially the Social Democrats.
Building projects like dams also symbolise nation-building after the war. In addition
to building a connection to the peasantry and working-class people, it was important to
emphasise Kekkonen’s roots and humble beginnings in a countryside croft. During the
1950s, Finland was still an agricultural country dominated by small farms. Therefore, as
Kekkonen opened an agricultural exhibition it was underlined how he himself had also
practised farming, and was still active in his region of birth. He also knows the
wilderness and hikes up to meet the poor people who live on the outskirts. As a symbol
of speaking for the disadvantaged, a road that had been built in the backwoods was
named ‘Urho Kekkonen road’ by the local people. Economic policy was the second
important theme of the propaganda employed by the Agrarian League during the
campaign. But unlike the right-wing National Coalition Party, the Agrarian League
concentrated on agricultural policy instead of general economy.51
For the finale towards the end of the film, foreign politics is addressed. At the end of
1955, the Soviet Union had just returned the area of Porkkala along the southern coast
of Finland, which it had rented as a military base. President Paasikivi and Prime
Minister Kekkonen return from Moscow on a plane to Helsinki in patriotic triumph:
their line of foreign policy had brought back Porkkala, thus securing sovereignty and
freedom for the nation. In the end, Kekkonen is represented as a strong authority and
saviour of the country, as the film ends in a statement: ‘Secure the continuity of the
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. It will guarantee our independence, it will secure a peaceful
era of reconstruction for our people.’
This film from the 1950s reflects the tradition of propaganda cinema and the
elements that prop up a personality cult. Throughout the film, Kekkonen is shown
half in the dark, half in light, as if he is someone who is about to appear, someone for
whom the people had been waiting. From the dark shadows of the war, the Finnish
people are also coming into the light, and Kekkonen is showing the way.
Kekkonen won the presidential election by the narrowest possible margin: on
the second round, his rival candidate K.A. Fagerholm (SDP) got 149 votes against
Kekkonen’s 151. After the election, the national papers wrote about a destructive
election campaign.52 The political atmosphere in Finland was quarrelsome, and a
general strike broke out on the day of Kekkonen’s inauguration.
The 1968 elections: father of the nation and president of the people
In 1968, Kekkonen had already been President for two terms, and ran for office for a
third time. At this point, there were no serious rivals who would have threatened his
position. In the elections, Kekkonen was the candidate for not only the Agrarian
League, but also for the socialist Democratic Union of the Finnish People (Suomen
51Ibid., 32.
52Signum 4: Lehtileikkeet ja painatteet (newspapers and publications), “lehtileikkeitä” (newspaper clippings), file 41/
10, UKA. See also e.g. Karjalan Maa, 1 March 1956; Sosialidemokraatti, 14 February 1956; Maakansa, 15 February 1956;
and Vapaa Sana, 15 February 1956.
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Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto i.e. Communists), the Social Democrats (SDP), the
socialist Social Democratic Union of the Workers and Small Farmers (TPSL), and a
minority of the Swedish People’s Party (RKP). The other candidates were the right-wing
National Coalition Party’s (Kok) Matti Virkkunen and the populist Finnish Rural
Party’s (SMP) Veikko Vennamo. Virkkunen’s campaign was described as a ‘crusade
against Kekkonen’, because it was not respectful enough towards the President in
office.53 Particularly Virkkunen’s slogan ‘The Country Needs a President’ irritated
Kekkonen so much that it has been seen as one reason why the Nation Coalition
Party did not get into the Cabinet during Kekkonen’s presidency.
Kekkonen’s objective, however, was not only to clinch victory, but also to gather as
wide a support base as possible – thus becoming a president who was truly ‘everyone’s
choice’: the president of the people. As such, emphasising that a politician is close to the
people is common in political rhetoric and discourse, but professing the leader to have
paternalistic ties with the people was also one of the main pillars of Stalin’s cult. At that
point, in the late 1960s, Kekkonen started to achieve his superior position, if not yet
undisputed, then overwhelmingly as leader.
Kekkonen would not agree to an election panel with the other two candidates, and so
Yleisradio catered to his wishes and tailored an election programme, which has been
described as Kekkonen’s direct address to the people. By the same token, he was not
willing to comment on the other candidates’ election themes.54 From the point of view
of political culture, it is interesting that Kekkonen saw campaigning as something he
should not have to comply with.55 There was political calculation in how the other
parties backed Kekkonen, and in the case of the SDP, it meant a clear shift. There had
been fierce opposition to Kekkonen in the party, and many of its voters were still
discontented as a result of his actions in domestic affairs.56
Also in the campaign film President, Statesman (1967), Kekkonen is portrayed as
having the support of a broad coalition of different parties, who approach him to ask
him to become their candidate.57 They are supposed to represent not only the parties,
but actually general opinion. He is also one to speak for the hold-outs – those who hold
opposing views – as a father would when raising children. The party office commis-
sioned the film from Suomi Filmi, one of the two large film-production companies in
Finland, and gave specific instructions on how it should look: Kekkonen was to be
presented simultaneously as a man of the people, someone from humble beginnings,
but also as a statesman and a father figure for the nation.58
As the tradition of propaganda films of authoritarian origin was evident in the 1955
film, this film has some clear influences of the American-style propaganda used in
political campaigning and the movie industry. The music is lighter, and resembles the
film scores of American movies of the time. The style of shooting and narration is more
intimate and playful. There are scenes from the president’s personal life involved as
well, which is a new theme. This Western phenomenon of politicians’ private lives
53Virmavirta, Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat, 29.
54Sisättö et al., Operaatio Kekkonen, 51.
55Virmavirta, Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat.
56Lauri Sivonen, Presidentin tekemiset (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1982), 38–9; and Virmavirta, Presidenttipeli ja sen
pelaajat, 28.
57Valtiomies, presidentti (Statesman, President), directed by Kari Uusitalo. Helsinki, Finland: Suomi-Filmi 1967.
58Interview with Kari Uusitalo 9 May 2016.
12 L. LOUNASMERI AND J. KORTTI
slowly starting to enter the public sphere was taken up in the Kekkonen film as
something rather novel in the Finnish context. Kekkonen is shown in his summer
villa, where he relaxes, reads the papers and listens to the radio, sits down for afternoon
coffee with his family and caresses a dog. A typical Finnish summer holiday involves a
boat ride, fishing, and spending time with children and grandchildren; the same holds
true for the president as well. Bringing the family and the dog to soften the image of a
politician was already used in Nixon’s famous vice-presidential campaign film of 1952,
which introduced his wife Pat and dog Checkers.59
The camera approaches Tamminiemi, the official residence of the President, from the
sea: the picture closes in on a man walking in a suit – Kekkonen. We hear how the task
of a president is difficult and challenging in the country. Kekkonen is the eighth one in
the job and ‘undoubtedly our most experienced statesman’. As he walks in the woods,
we learn how he has witnessed the Finnish nation’s recent history, and knows the
national character. By showing his birth croft in the countryside, his life is intertwined
with that of the Finnish nation: rustic and unyielding. Even though he left the country-
side to educate himself, his connection to his native area was never broken: he still
understands the Finnish way of life and is faithful to his origins. This was a key point to
emphasise in Finland, where industrialisation and migration to the cities occurred late,
and where the connection between the small elite and the people, as well as societal
cleavages, had always been challenging. The emphasising of modest country roots was
common with the personal cults of communist leaders. The post-war structural change
in Finland resembled that of Eastern Europe, where a country’s economic structure
transformed very quickly, not only towards an industrial, but also towards a post-
industrial, society.60
The film cuts again to the theme of sports, and shows Kekkonen going for a run and
jumping up the famous Seurasaari Park stone steps near his residence. As a young man,
he challenged himself to become a champion of Finland in both the triple jump and
high jump, and the skill had not been forgotten. Stressing the athleticism and youth of
the leader has been common in image management both in totalitarian systems
(Mussolini, Putin) as well as in American democracies (presidents playing golf).61
Inasmuch as the sporting achievement of dictators, such as Nicolae Ceaușescu or the
North-Korean Kims, have usually been fabricated, Kekkonen was a real athlete in his
youth.
The theme of war, peace, and foreign policy is particularly addressed. Moving on to
the graveyard and church, one learns that the Finnish people did not acquire their
sovereignty for free, but had to defend it in taking up arms. While discussing neutrality
policy and the desire for peace, the imagery moves on to a military parade and soldiers
with medals of honour to emphasise the importance of the army. The last episode of the
film handles international relations, which are carefully dealt with by going through an
imagery of state visits. Kekkonen walks together with Kennedy and we learn that
59Diamond and Bates, The Spot, 70–5.
60See e.g. Markus Wien and Georgi Dimitrov, ‘Three Manifestations of his Cult,’ in The Leader Cult in Communist
Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, eds. Balázs Apor, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones, and E. A. Rees (Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 195; and Timo Myllyntaus, ‘Vaaran laelta toimiston nurkkaan – taloudellinen kehitys ja
elämänmuodon muutokset,’ in Suuri muutos. Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan kehityspiirteitä, ed. Marjatta Rahikainen (Lahti:
University of Helsinki, Lahden tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus, 1992), 47.
61Burke, Eywitnessing, 71.
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Western relations are important, since ‘no one can explain our point of view better than
we.’ The President visits four continents, which means our foreign policy has been
accepted in both East and West. Grandiose music is played as Kekkonen visits the
Soviet Union: these relations form the basis of Finnish foreign politics, and the
President’s person is extremely important in upholding them. Relating to the UN
general assembly, it is stated that Finland takes the role of a doctor rather than a
judge – a famous saying in Finland describing the effort to remain neutral during the
Cold War.
The policy of neutrality and the sensitive geopolitical situation of Finland during the
Cold War was central for Finland’s, and especially Kekkonen’s, foreign policy. Finnish-
Soviet relations were based on the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual
Assistance (FCMA or YYA treaty) with the Soviet Union from 1948. The agreement,
made with a Western European country, can be seen as a step moving towards the
Eastern Bloc. However, it was much more favourable for the Finns than the agreements
Moscow made with Romania and Hungary, which actually were models for the initial
FCMA treaty by the Soviets.
Yet the Finnish policy of neutrality was criticised for Finlandisation – that Finland
had to abide by the Soviet Union’s policy rules. Among European political commenta-
tors, Kekkonen’s policy was also seen as exceptionally skilled politics. As the Italian
newspaper Il Popolo wrote in 1971, Kekkonen’s politics can be described as: never get
yourself into a situation where you have to say ‘no’ to the Soviets, but proceed in a way
that they say ‘yes’ to the Finns.62
At the end of the film, Kekkonen’s long political career is emphasised, and further
authority is built on the words of the late President Paasikivi, who in 1955 stated:
‘Kekkonen is my candidate . . . I have not met another man so talented in my lifetime.’
Portrayed in the movie as a president for the people, Kekkonen won the 1968 election
on the first round of voting, receiving 201 electors. Even though he received strong
support, the other candidates, Virkkunen and Vennamo, got 66 and 32 votes, which
disappointed Kekkonen, who was elected with votes from the leftist parties, including
the SDP. Giving this political support, the SDP returned to the centre of political
power.63 After the election, the international press wrote that Kekkonen’s aim in
becoming the President of the whole nation was not realised, as the campaigning was
fierce and protest votes were made. The West German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
commented that the campaign had opened old wounds, as it was fought fiercely by the
opposing parties, the right-wing National Coalition and the populist Finnish Rural
Party.64 Kekkonen also received a record number of poison-pen letters and threats.65
The special characteristics of Finnish political life, foreign politics dominated by the
president and the inflamed political atmosphere, came out in the writings of the Nordic
and West German papers.66
62Jorma Kallenautio, Suomi kylmän rauhan maailmassa (Helsinki: SKS. 2005), 303.
63Virmavirta, Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat, 30–1.
64Signum 2. Sisällön mukaan akteiksi järjestetyt asiakirjat (documents arranged according to subject matter),
‘Politiikka’ (politics), presidentinvaali 1968 (presidental election) file 21/116, UKA.
65Sisättö et al., Operaatio Kekkonen, 52.
66Signum 2. Sisällön mukaan akteiksi järjestetyt asiakirjat (documents arranged according to subject matter),
‘Politiikka’ (politics), presidentinvaali 1968 (presidental election) file 21/116, UKA.
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At this point in Kekkonen’s presidency, there are many similarities to the cult of
Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. Tito ‘was represented as wise, far-sighted, resolute,
proud, generous and sensitive’, ‘understands the essence of reality’, and ‘always takes
the “right” decision’. Also, Tito’s active role in international politics, which was
uncommon among the Eastern Bloc countries, as Soviet satellites, resemble that of
Kekkonen’s.67 In Finland during the late 1960s student revolt, Kekkonen, a former
student radical himself, supported radicals. This included not only the most visible and
soon-to-become mythical Finnish action of 1968, the occupation of the Old Student
House in Helsinki, but also other ways to embrace the radicals. Tito, for his part, also
used the student revolts of the late 1960s for his political needs and the strengthening of
his cult of personality.68
President by profession in 1977
After the presidential term 1968–74, the next four years in office were secured for
Kekkonen by passing an exceptional law in Parliament; Kekkonen was elected for the
fourth period without an electoral process. This period of Finnish contemporary history
has been seen as the nadir of Finnish democracy. Kekkonen refused to enter the race
but promised to continue, if he were elected by other means. Hence, all the major
parties asked him to continue and passed the exceptional legislation. Kekkonen had
achieved a superior position in Finnish politics at that point, but there was also a very
topical case that made him and his personal relationship with the Soviets seem
irreplaceable in the early 1970s. Finland was negotiating a free-trade agreement with
the European Economic Community (EEC) which was crucial not only for foreign
politics (to show that Finland was part of the West), but particularly for Finnish
industrial and business life. The Soviets were very dubious about the motives of the
EEC, but Kekkonen managed to assure them that the agreement would not jeopardise
the Finnish-Soviet relationship. Moreover, the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki, was coming up and Kekkonen wanted to
host the conference.
For the 1978 elections, the biggest parties – the SDP first – had already chosen their
candidate three years earlier, in 1975. This time, the National Coalition Party also chose
Kekkonen. The elections were overwhelmed with votes for the President, as he received
82% of the vote and 259 of the 301 electors, backed by the four biggest parties. The
other candidates represented small parties: Rauno Westerholm from the Finnish
Christian League; Veikko Vennamo from the Finnish Rural Party; and Ahti M.
Salonen from the Constitutional People’s Party. As there were no serious rivals to
challenge Kekkonen, the possibility of low voter turnout became a problem. Yleisradio
published fact briefings to generate enthusiasm about the elections. There was an effort
to make the campaign programmes as interesting as possible, but the presentation of
67Stanislav Sretenovic and Artan Puto, ‘Leader Cults in the Western Balkans (1945–90): Josip Broz Tito and Enver
Hoxha,’ in The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, eds. Balázs Apor, Jan C. Behrends,
Polly Jones, and E. A. Rees (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 209.
68Sretenovic and Puto, ‘Leader Cults in the Western Balkans (1945–90),’ 213–14. See also Boris Kanzleiter,
‘Yugoslavia,’ in 1968 in Europe. A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977, eds. Martin Klimke and Joachim
Scharloth (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2008), 219–28.
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the different candidates was incomplete, when Kekkonen again refused to appear
together with the others. Instead, old short films of him were shown.69 Kekkonen’s
slogan for the campaign was ‘Trust Across Borders’, which in popular speech became
‘Kekkonen across borders’. As Kekkonen was already quite old and his condition had
weakened, the campaigning was rather mild.70
Day of the President, which came out in 1977, was not a campaign film, but described
a typical day in office of the president-elect and was presented as a documentary.71 The
idea of a documentary-style film was credited to Leo Tujunen, the chief editor of
Suomen Kuvalehti, the Finnish equivalent of Time magazine. He worked with a back-
ground group including Kekkonen’s old friend Kustaa Vilkuna and Maarit Huovinen, a
young reporter close to Kekkonen. Reminiscing, Huovinen described the format as one
where the viewers could see ‘how a professional manages the daily work of a president’.
The film was a way to address the people and bring them closer to the everyday
experience of the president’s work. It also gave them the chance to see the more
unofficial side of the president.72 The documentary producers, Merja Halmevaara-
Molarius and Jorma Molarius, wanted to gather material on the President’s persona
and the way he interacted and exercised his power.73 Two different versions of the film
were made: an original Finnish one and a shorter version produced for the international
market. The international version is a more polished one without the critical remarks of
political opponents, or an emphasis on superpower relations, making it more a product
of public diplomacy.
In the national version, the matter of the exceptional law is addressed right at the
beginning (and omitted from the international one). Reading and commenting on the
newspapers in the morning gives Kekkonen the opportunity to indirectly criticise the
media as well as his political opponents. As Kekkonen goes out for a run, he is a
President defying the storm. It was very important to show his physical fitness at this
old age. At that time, Kekkonen already had serious health problems, which were
known but silenced not only by his administration, but also by the media. The
Finnish media practised self-censorship concerning both the President and Soviet
affairs up until the 1980s.74
In the film, however, trees sway in the wind, but the President likes harsh weather:
hardship does not bring him down, but on the contrary, gives him energy. Kekkonen is
a man of many talents and interests: he knows culture, arts, and sports, but represents
the original Finnish folk. In the sauna, naked, he is a robust Finnish man who can stand
the heat – better than anyone else.
The day of President Kekkonen is endlessly long. He is a superman who flies from
one moment and matter to another, changing roles and his dress in an instant. One sees
in the film that fixing the presidential schedule is an exact business: he is an important
69Matti Paavonsalo, Kekkosen valta (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1995), 221; and Virmavirta Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat, 92.
70Virmavirta, Presidenttipeli ja sen pelaajat, 94.
71Presidentin päivä (Day of the President), directed by Jorma Molarius, Helsinki, Finland: Yleisradio TV1,
Yhteiskunnalliset kohdeohjelmat, 1977.
72Interview with Maarit Huovinen, 12 May 2016.
73Paavo Rytsä, ‘Presidentin päivä,’ Yle Elävä Arkisto, 3 June 2006, http://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2007/06/03/presidentin-
paiva (accessed 30 September 2017).
74Lotta Lounasmeri, ‘Through Rose or Blue and White Glasses? Decades of News about the Soviet Union in the
Finnish Press,’ Nordicom Review 34, no. 1 (2013): 105–23; and Esko Salminen, Vaikeneva valtiomahti? Neuvostoliitto/
Venäjä Suomen lehdistössä 1968–1991 (Helsinki: Edita, 1996).
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man, who gives his time to others by the minute as he sees fit. Even though Kekkonen
chats in an intimate manner with his closest political colleagues, friends, and staff, he
receives a lot of respect from others, and is above others especially when performing his
duties.
In the national film version, international relations of commerce are introduced in
the form of icebreaker deals with the US, and the Kostamus construction project in the
Soviet Union. Emphasising the role of the leader as the creator of economic success was
also one of the pillars in Stalin’s cult. However, the necessity of maintaining dynamic
trading relations with Western markets was also important in Finnish foreign policy
during the Cold War era.
In the film, intimacy between Kekkonen and the viewer is created by using close-ups:
he looks into the camera intensely and addresses the viewer directly by saying, for
example, ‘just between us I would say . . .’.75 All in all, the film concentrates intensely on
the persona and figure of the President: the interviewer is not shown. When reading the
papers, only Kekkonen’s head is shown. He looks at the camera and articulates his ideas
carefully.
Again, the message of foreign policy becomes clear when it is stated that a broad
majority stands for the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, while at the same time marginalising
opponents. The President speaks of Finland as a responsible nation when talking about
world affairs, international cooperation, and development aid. The film culminates in a
description of the President as a primal tree. He gets his strength from Finnish brown
bread and can bear anything: his lonely work is as President, as he cannot share that
power and responsibility.
Finnish Cold War campaign films: a bricolage of Eastern and Western
influences
As political campaigning, the films analysed are very impressive. At the time of their
release, the reach they exhibited over voting citizens was of a scale not imaginable
today. The power of these pictures was also in their seemingly documentary quality, as
their propagandistic nature was more or less hidden. Nevertheless, the traditional
elements of propaganda are visible in the contextual as well as textual elements. In
the narrative being constructed in these films, similar elements were repeated from one
decade to the next. The themes and issues that were discussed naturally varied accord-
ing to the political and social situation of the time. Repetition is effective, as the same
elements and symbols are reiterated. All of the films have a nationalistic and also
populist tone, creating a spirit of sacrifice (especially the 1955 film which came out a
decade after the war had ended), where everyone was needed to pull their weight under
the leadership of a great man.
In visual terms, the influences of Soviet-style totalitarian propaganda are most
obvious in the first film from 1955. The film is in black and white; the use of light
and shadow as well as the editing of the film contribute to the building of the
personality cult. In all of the films, the portrayal of Kekkonen’s leadership bears
elements similar to those of Stalin’s leader cult, which was built on four mainstays.
75Morreale, A New Beginning, 13.
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First, his close relationship to Lenin was emphasised as he was depicted as Lenin’s
closest colleague, uniting heroes under the same themes. For Kekkonen, the significance
of Paasikivi is repeatedly brought up, culminating in the official foreign-policy line
carrying the names of the two presidents. Second, Stalin was seen as creator of
economic success, as he carried out the Five-Year Plans. Kekkonen is shown going
around the country, overseeing a series of construction projects and farming exhibi-
tions. Third, Stalin’s writings were considered authoritative. Much in the same way are
the large array of texts and speeches produced by Kekkonen being underlined. Fourth,
the Soviet leader’s paternalistic ties with the people were emphasised, a point which is a
central one in the communication of Kekkonen’s films.76
Later, especially in the 1968 film, the American film industry and political campaign
elements become more evident. Along with the style of filming, the elements of the
stories are similar to those in their American counterparts. Plots in election films are
generally simple. The leader is tested, he wins the challenges, and becomes wiser in the
process. This pattern, typically used in American campaign films, is effective in all its
clichés. Recycling, repetition, and simple expression offer an image of stability and
certainty in a world that is uncertain and confusing to the point of chaos. The power of
such myths is especially strong in visual representation. As in product advertising,
American presidential campaign films were based on similar symbols repeated over and
over. The visual clichés used symbolised America and were connected to the candidate:
the presidential airplane; the US flag; farms and harvest; construction workers and
factory workers. The significance of images was strengthened by textual narration. An
idea has been repeated that the American people have gone through a lot of difficulties,
but there will be a new beginning that the candidate will bring with him. In the
storyline, many of the American films introduced the candidate first as a persona,
followed by a presentation of his political achievements and international relations,
ending in assurances of a commitment to peace.77
In all of Kekkonen’s films, the same symbols constructing Kekkonen as a leader were
repeated. He had risen from the ranks of ordinary folks and made an outstanding career
as a statesman. In the films, Kekkonen represents and symbolises the Finnish people –
original and undivided. He even becomes a Messianic figure who can unite the broken
and wounded people and, in his wisdom, point in the right direction. Kekkonen
appealed to the voters by presenting himself, on the one hand, as a man of the people
and, on the other, as a wise hero who held a true vision for leading his people. In
defending the poor and the inhabitants of remote backwoods he was at the same time
‘one of us’, a representative of the working Finnish people, and on the other, a father
figure and a leader carrying the heavy burden of responsibility.
As a leader, he is sovereign and brilliant, and his abilities in all sectors are phenom-
enal. He becomes a mythical hero with no weaknesses. As the builder of inner unity and
reconciliation, he simultaneously protected his people from outside threats. His perso-
nal, confidential relationships with the superpowers, with the Soviet Union in first
place, guarantees the people’s safety. Referring to the official foreign-policy line as the
76Sarah Davis, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia. Terror, Propaganda and Dissent (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 148.
77Morreale, A New Beginning, 10–13.
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Paasikivi-Kekkonen line is just made for constructing a basis for the personification of
this policy in Kekkonen himself, so that in the end no other politician found it possible
to challenge him. This theme was the core of Kekkonen’s propaganda.
These political films show a carefully constructed narrative that kept pace with the
president’s position. Little by little, Kekkonen’s public image became well established
and harmonious, as the early stigmas as an opportunist, turncoat, womaniser, and
drunkard faded. By depicting the national Finnish character and the history of the
Finnish nation, the figure of Kekkonen is identified as symbolising that of the people.
The will of the people is embodied in him. In the final analysis, the ideology commu-
nicated in the films is not really about political direction but about political truth, which
is exactly what propaganda aims to construct.
Overall, what is particular in terms of propaganda for Kekkonen’s campaign films is
the balancing of Eastern and Western influences. As such, this was not Kekkonen’s
‘invention’, nor did it concern only political communication. A central theme already
present in the inter-war period in Finnish cultural propaganda and diplomacy was to
show that Finland was part of the Western, not the Eastern, cultural sphere. After
the Second World War, the policy continued, but the artists and diplomats were in a
position where they had to consider the Soviets as well.78 Nevertheless, the films present
a modern, dynamic, but down-to-earth leader of a rapidly modernising Western
country. The manner of presentation is familiar to the practice of American campaign-
ing, whereas Kekkonen’s films also resemble the personality cults and image-making of
the communist leaders of the Eastern Block. To what degree the outcomes represented
the intentional use of propaganda techniques originating from both East and West, is
difficult to estimate.
This duality, the overall balancing between two sides of the Cold War, is the very
essence of the Kekkonen era in the Finland of the twentieth century. The giant of
Finnish diplomacy, Max Jacobson, saw this policy – including not so glorious forms of
‘Finlandisation’ – as a success story after all. This conservative policy was based on
stability, ‘designed to keep things as they are, and devoid of ideological ambitions’.79
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